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The Article analyzes the International Court of Justice’s decision in 
the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. 
Chile) case and its failure to provide an original and effective legal 
solution to an important territorial dispute in Latin America. As a 
response to this, this Article makes the case for the engagement of other 
institutions and actors including the Secretary General of the United 
Nations, the Organization of American States, and Pope Francis, who 
could facilitate mediation processes for the resolution of this 
international conflict. This Article considers historical facts that 
demonstrate the intention of the parties to find a negotiated solution to 
their territorial dispute. It makes the case for using mediation and 
conciliation, for the resolution of the conflict, and makes arguments 
against power politics and the use of military force as instruments for 
the resolution of the territorial dispute. Moreover, this Article 
demonstrates that the people of Bolivia and Chile can find a mutually 
beneficial solution to their dispute by creating, among others, civil 
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society reconciliation commissions with the leading participation of 
indigenous people. Finally, this Article makes the case for indigenous 
peoples, as the original owners of the territory under dispute, to become 
essential actors in the process of resolving the conflict. 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 30 
I. POWER POLITICS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS ................................... 32 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, OR POWER POLITICS? ...... 36 
III. THE TERRITORY OF BOLIVIA AND CHILE, THE INCA EMPIRE,  
AND THE UTI POSSIDETIS PRINCIPLE .................................................... 39 
IV. THE ORIGINS OF THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE,  
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF  
AMERICAN STATES .............................................................................. 46 
A. The Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean 
(Bolivia v. Chile) Case at the I.C.J. ................................... 49 
B. Dissenting Opinions and the Negotiation Option ................ 53 
V. AN INTEGRATIVE NORMATIVE APPROACH FOR THE RESOLUTION OF 
THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE .............................. 56 
A. Pope Francis and U.N. Secretary General António Guterres 
as Mediators of the Bolivia-Chile Territorial Dispute ...... 61 
B. Indigenous Peoples’ Diplomacy and International 
Conciliation as Necessary for the Resolution of the Bolivia-
Chile Territorial Dispute ................................................... 69 




In the case Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean, the 
International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”), contrary to Bolivia’s petition, 
ruled that Chile did not have a legal obligation to negotiate sovereign 
access to the Pacific Ocean with Bolivia.1 Despite its ruling, the I.C.J. 
encouraged Bolivia and Chile to continue their historical efforts in 
 
1.  Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bol. v. Chile), 
Judgment, 2018 I.C.J. 507, ¶ 564 (Oct. 1). https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-
related/153/153-20181001-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
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drafting a solution to the international territorial dispute. In particular, 
the I.C.J. stated: 
[T]he Court’s finding should not be understood as precluding the 
Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges, in a spirit of 
good neighborliness, to address the issues relating to the landlocked 
situation of Bolivia, the solution to which they have both recognized 
to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the part of the 
Parties, meaningful negotiations can be undertaken.2 
The I.C.J.’s ruling was consistent with Article 33.1 of the United 
Nations (“U.N.”) Charter because there are other legal means, besides 
judicial settlement, for the peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile 
territorial dispute, including mediation and conciliation.3 However, it is 
important to remember that I.C.J. decisions are valid only for a specific 
case, and they are not considered precedents for other cases in the same 
court, or other international or national tribunals.4 Therefore, Bolivia 
could continue to attempt the adjudicatory venue to achieve its 
objective of finding a negotiated solution to obtain a sovereign access 
to the Pacific Ocean. However, a better approach would be for both 
sides, Bolivia and Chile, to use other means for the peaceful resolution 
of their territorial dispute. 
As a person of Bolivian descent and a professor of international 
law, my analysis seeks to understand the implications of the I.C.J. 
decision for Bolivia and propose a peaceful means for the resolution of 
the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute that considers the interests of 
indigenous people. This Article analyzes the reasoning of the I.C.J. 
judges and their failure to provide an original and effective legal 
discourse to enable Bolivia and Chile to continue their efforts to find a 
negotiated solution to their territorial dispute. This Article highlights 
the dissenting opinions of the president of the I.C.J., Abdulqawi 
Ahmed Yusuf, Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson, Judge Nawaf Salam, 
and ad hoc Judge Yves Daudet. This Article also proposes the 
engagement of other institutions and actors including the Secretary 
 
2. Id. 
3. U.N. Charter art. 105 ¶ 3. 
4. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993. 
According to Article 59 of the Statute: “The decision of the Court has no binding force 
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.” Id. 
3
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General of the U.N., António Guterres, the Organization of American 
States (“O.A.S.”), and Pope Francis, who could facilitate mediation and 
conciliation processes for the resolution of the dispute. 
This Article makes the case for indigenous people, as the original 
owners of the territory in dispute, to become essential actors in public 
diplomacy efforts to facilitate negotiation processes between Chile and 
Bolivia. The Article demonstrates that the people of Chile and Bolivia 
can find a mutually beneficial solution to their dispute by creating, 
among others, civil society reconciliation commissions. It shows that 
this can contribute to building up a political context favorable to the 
resolution of their territorial disputes and to the development of better 
international relations between Bolivia and Chile. 
I. POWER POLITICS AND NATIONAL INTERESTS 
To understand the Bolivia-Chile conflict, it is important to know 
the historical context that has influenced their international relations. It 
is also important to understand the ideas, in Chile and Bolivia, that have 
created the conditions for intense conflicts and the lack of political will 
to resolve their territorial disputes. Colonialism, racism, and militarism 
are some of the ideologies that have influenced the international 
relations between the two countries.5 
Chile and Bolivia’s histories have each been characterized by 
totalitarian regimes that have sustained racist views of indigenous 
populations in both countries.6 In Chile, the dictatorship of General 
Augusto Pinochet protected Neo-Nazi movements that embraced racist 
and violent views of politics.7 Military dictatorships in Bolivia, 
including the one of General Garcia Meza, protected Nazi war criminals 
 
5. See Aparajita Gangopadhyay, From Land Wars to Gas Wars: Chile—Bolivia 
Relations and Globalisation, 70 India Quarterly 139, 139 (2014). 
6. See Javiera Barandiarán, Researching Race in Chile, 47 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 
161, 169 (2012) (analyzing racial discrimination in Chile); see also Henry Stobart, 
Bolivia’s Anti-Racism Law: Transforming a Culture?, in CULTURES OF ANTI-RACISM 
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 191–92 (Peter Wade et al., eds., 2019) 
(analyzing racism in Bolivia and legal reforms to address it). 
7. See generally  Ricardo Lagos et al., The Pinochet Dilemma, 114 FOREIGN 
POL’Y 26–39 (1999) (analyzing charges for crimes against humanity against Chilean 
President Pinochet); see also HUGH O’SHAUGHNESSY, PINOCHET: THE POLITICS OF 
TORTURE 49–118 (2000). 
4
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such as Klaus Barbie.8 Both countries have embraced views based on 
racist presuppositions, and both have been guilty of widespread 
violations of human rights, including tortures and killings of political 
opponents.9 One of the main features of these totalitarian movements 
was their views regarding the racial inferiority of indigenous 
communities. For example, in Chile there is widespread recognition of 
its mestizo identity, which is the result of the integration of the Spanish 
and indigenous races.10 Despite this fact, there is also a lack of 
acknowledgment of the importance of indigenous peoples in Chile’s 
political and economic structures. Indeed, “today’s actual living and 
breathing indigenous peoples are both actively ignored and ‘excluded 
symbolically and materially’ from Chilean society . . . . As a result, 
Chile purportedly has no ‘Indian problem,’ unlike its more ‘indigenous’ 
and ‘backwards’ geopolitical rivals and neighbors, Bolivia and Peru.”11 
The influence of totalitarian ideologies, in both countries, provided 
a foundation for racist and discriminatory treatment of indigenous 
communities.12 In that historical context, it was very difficult to 
construct effective efforts to resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation.13 
The ruling elites of both countries have focused on the protection of 
 
8. See generally PETER MCFARREN & FADRIQUE IGLESIAS, THE DEVIL’S 
AGENT: LIFE, TIME AND CRIMES OF NAZI KLAUS BARBIE (2013). 
9. Id. at 49–118. 
10. Kevin Funk, “Today There Are No Indigenous People” in Chile? 
Connecting the Mapuche Struggle to Anti-Neoliberal Mobilizations in South America, 
4 J. POL. LATIN AM. 125, 127 (2013). 
11. Id. at 127–28 n. 3 (“the quotation in this essay’s title – that ‘today there are 
no indigenous people’ in Chile – is from a 1978 report by the Chilean government’s 
Agricultural and Livestock Development Agency . . . summarizing the Pinochet 
regime’s posture towards indigenous claims.”). 
12. See generally Graeme S.  Mount, Chile and the Nazis, in MEMORY, 
OBLIVION, AND JEWISH CULTURE IN LATIN AMERICA 77–90 (Agosin Marjorie ed., 
2005) (discussing the influence of Nazis in Chile); see also Jean Grugel, Nationalist 
Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile, 4 BULL. LATIN AM. RES. 109–22 (1985); 
see also MCFARREN & FADRIQUE IGLESIAS, supra note 8 (analyzing the influence of 
Nazis in Bolivia). 
13. Jean Grugel, Nationalist Movements and Fascist Ideology in Chile, 4 BULL. 
LATIN AM. RES. 109, 113 (1985). 
5
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their economic and political interests and have disregarded the interests 
of important sectors of society, namely indigenous people.14 
The belief that Chilean society is superior because of its European 
identity and Bolivia is an inferior country because of its large 
indigenous population is completely contrary to sociological, historical, 
and scientific evidence.15 Consistent with this reality, there are sectors 
of Chilean society that have supported efforts for the peaceful 
resolution of territorial disputes between Chile and Bolivia.16 Applying 
a constructivist perspective of international relations, it can be said that 
prevalent ethnocentric ideas in Chile and Bolivia have shaped both 
countries’ international relations. 
In the current historical context, Bolivia and Chile are facing 
political instability.  President Evo Morales, who was one of the main 
proponents to take the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute to the I.C.J., was 
removed from power.17 As a result, there is an ongoing process to have 
new presidential elections in Bolivia.18 Ethnic and political conflicts 
have become more prevalent in Bolivia. In Chile, around twenty-six 
protesters were killed during demonstrations against President 
Sebastián Piñera’s government.19 Following the demonstrations in 
Chile, the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights 
said, “during the recent mass protests and state of emergency the police 
and army failed to adhere to international human rights norms and 
 
14. See Leslie E. Wehner, Developing Mutual Trust: The Othering Process 
between Bolivia and Chile, 36 CAN. J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 109, 125–26 
(2011) (analyzing the ruling elites of Bolivia and Chiles and their roles in increasing 
conflict between the two countries). 
15. See ALANA LENTIN, RACISM AND ANTI-RACISM IN EUROPE 72, 77 (2004) 
(analyzing false presuppositions of racist ideologies). 
16. See, e.g., Canciller Ribera calificó de “lamentable” apoyo de diputados 
opositores a demanda marítima de Bolivia, EL MOSTRADOR (July 30, 2019), 
https://www.elmostrador.cl/noticias/pais/2019/07/30/canciller-ribera-califico-de-
lamentable-apoyo-de-diputados-opositores-a-demanda-maritima-de-bolivia/ (For 
example, Chilean congressman, Boris Barrera, and Chilean Senator, Alejandro 
Navarro, supported Bolivia’s case to obtain a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean). 
17. See Kevin Clarke, Was there a coup in Bolivia? After Evo Morales, what’s 
next?, AM. MAG. (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.americamagazine.org/politics-
society/2019/11/27/was-there-coup-bolivia-after-evo-morales-whats-next. 
18. Id. 
19.  Chile protests: UN accuses security forces of human rights abuses, BBC 
NEWS (Dec. 13, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-50779466. 
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standards relating to management of assemblies and the use of force.”20 
Because of generalized discontent regarding economic and social 
injustice, and despite the Chilean success at the I.C.J. in the Bolivia-
Chile case, President Sebastián Piñera is one of the least popular 
presidents in the history of Chile with a fourteen percent approval 
rating.21 These facts demonstrate the political and social fragility of 
Latin American societies that have not addressed their ethnic and social 
justice issues properly. 
Despite the similarities between Bolivia and Chile, there are also 
meaningful differences, including their military power. 
According to the World Bank, Bolivia’s military expenditure in 
2018 was 1.5% of its GDP.22 In 2017, Bolivia had 71,000 armed forces 
personnel, which is 1.3% of its labor force.23 Chile’s military 
expenditure in 2018 was 1.9% of its GDP, and in 2017, Chile had 
122,000 armed forces personnel, which is 1.3% of its labor force.24 
Because of Chile’s historic military and economic superiority, there has 
been unequal bargaining relations between Chile and Bolivia.25 This 
type of relationship illustrates how “[p]ower can be thought of as the 
ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would 
not do . . . .”26  It is important to also note that besides military power, 
there are other forms of power, including economic, cultural, and 
moral.27 
 
20.  U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Human Rights 
Office report on Chile crisis describes multiple police violations and calls for reforms, 
OHCHR (Dec. 13, 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25423&
LangID=E. 
21. Dave Sherwood, Support for Chile’s Pinera lowest for president since 
Pinochet era: poll, REUTERS (Oct. 27, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
chile-protests/support-for-chiles-pinera-lowest-for-president-since-pinochet-era-
poll-idUSKBN1X60NW. 
22. The World Bank, World Development Indicators: Military expenditures and 
arms transfers. http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/5.7 (last visited Nov. 9, 2020). 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. See Gangopadhyay, supra note 5, at 141. 
26. ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: 
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 11 (1997). 
27. See Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power, 80 FOREIGN POL’Y 153, 155 (1990) 
(analyzing soft power as a concept). 
7
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Considering this reality, Bolivia and Chile should make efforts to 
change the characteristics of their bilateral relations, which are 
characterized by mutual distrust, and acknowledge that it is consistent 
with their national interests to improve their international trade 
relations, their mutual commitment to the protection of the 
environment, and their commitment for the protection of fundamental 
human rights among others.28 These countries should also take steps to 
restore their diplomatic relations to jointly address global problems of 
mutual interest. A peaceful resolution of territorial disputes is necessary 
to transform the broken international relations between Bolivia and 
Chile. Cooperation is even more crucial due to the extreme human and 
economic costs of the COVID-19 pandemic—especially in Latin 
America. In the current context, sustained international cooperation 
between neighboring countries such as Bolivia and Chile is essential. 
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY, OR POWER POLITICS? 
Because of its historically superior military and economic strength, 
Chile’s foreign policy has denied Bolivia’s aspirations to obtain a 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean. Chile nonetheless has negotiated 
frequently, under the auspices of international organizations, with 
Bolivia to resolve their territorial dispute, including at the Ibero-
American Summit (2003) and the Monterrey Summit of the Americas 
(2004).29 Beginning in 2012, at the Sixty-Seventh session of the U.N. 
General Assembly—and contrary to the historical trend—Chile started 
 
28. See Wehner, supra note 14, at 109–38 (analyzing the mutual distrust in the 
bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia, and some efforts to change that 
dynamic). 
29. See Christopher R. Rossi, A Case Ill Suited for Judgment: Constructing ‘A 
Sovereign Access to the Sea’ in the Atacama Desert, 48 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
28, 79 (2017) (“The parties returned to numerous bilateral meetings in Uruguay (the 
‘Fresh Approach’ meetings, 1986-87), at the XIII Ibero-American Summit in Bolivia 
(2003), at the Monterrey Summit of the Americas (2004), on four occasions in 2005, 
(New York, Salamanca, Mar del Plata, and Montevideo). During the Sixty-Seventh 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly in 2012, Bolivia affirmed that 
bilateral options remained open with Chile; Chile responded by declaring Bolivia 
lacks any legal basis for claiming a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean by territories 
belonging to Chile”). 
8
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to express a lack of willingness to continue diplomatic negotiations to 
resolve Bolivia’s landlocked situation.30 
In reaction to an unfavorable array of opposing international 
political forces, which prevented the continuation of bilateral 
diplomatic negotiations, Bolivia pursued an international adjudicatory 
mechanism to persuade Chile to continue their negotiations. In 2013, 
Bolivia brought a petition to the I.C.J. against Chile.31 However, the 
court ruled against Bolivia and decided Chile does not have a legal 
obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific 
Ocean.32 Although it was not the intention of the I.C.J., the court’s 
decision has validated the views of certain sectors of Chilean and 
Bolivian societies who believe military power is the only means to 
resolve territorial disputes between sovereign states. 
By ruling in favor of Chile—the country with more military 
might—and by deciding that Chile does not have a legal obligation to 
negotiate with Bolivia—the weaker militant country—the I.C.J. failed 
to contribute to finding a normative solution to the countries’ long-
lasting territorial dispute. This conflict will continue to influence 
international relations between Chile and Bolivia significantly, and will 
also continue to have a negative impact in regional political and 
economic integration in South America.33 
Despite denying the existence of Chile’s legal obligation to 
negotiate with Bolivia, the I.C.J. has recognized the historical necessity, 
for both countries, of continuing their diplomatic effort to find a 
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked situation.34 At this juncture, one of the 
main questions is whether powerful political elements will form 
bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia, or if a normative solution 
to resolve territorial disputes by peaceful means, consistent with 
 
30. Id. at 79–80. 
31. See generally Erica Endlein, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific 
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile): Deal Or No Deal, 27 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 365 (2019); 
see also International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific 
Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile), ICJ-CIJ, https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/153-By (specifying 
Bolivia brought the petition). 
32. Endlein, supra note 31, at 371. 
33. See generally Mitchell A. Seligson, Popular Support for Regional Economic 
Integration in Latin America, 31 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 129–50 (1999) (analyzing the 
support of Latin Americans to processes of economic integration). 
34. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564. 
9
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principles of global justice, will prevail. If the power political paradigm 
continues, Chile will continue to impose its views on Bolivia through 
superior military power. If the normative-global justice perspective 
prevails, then both countries will use mediation, conciliation, and other 
normative mechanism to find a peaceful solution to their territorial 
dispute. 
Considering the overwhelming majority of Bolivians have a 
lifelong ideological and cultural commitment to restore their country’s 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, and that sectors of the Chilean 
population also believe in the importance of finding a mutually 
beneficial resolution of the conflict, there is a historical and moral 
imperative to find a normative solution. Against the failure of the I.C.J. 
to apply international law norms in an effective manner to contribute to 
restore the negotiated solution venue for the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
dispute, the discourse of international law continues to lay the 
foundation to resolve the conflict.35 International law recognizes the 
importance of the principle of equality of sovereign states to maintain 
peaceful relations between and among sovereign states.36 Developing 
nations, such as Bolivia, which struggle against powerful neighbor 
countries, such as Chile, are interested in a just interpretation and 
implementation of international legal standards to resolve issues that 
undermine their economic development, such as the lack of access to 
the oceans. 
Chile’s reliance on its superior military power to ensure that Bolivia 
accepts its landlocked condition has shaped relations between the 
countries. In place of militant might, Bolivia has relied on diplomacy, 
international institutions, and international law to resolve its territorial 
disputes with Chile.37 Chileans and Bolivians need to understand the 
importance of resolving their territorial disputes as part of 
 
35. See generally Oisin Suttle, Law as Deliberative Discourse: The Politics of 
International Legal Argument - Social Theory with Historical Illustrations, 
12 J. INT’L L. & INT’L REL. 154–64 (2016) (analyzing International Law as a 
discourse). 
36. See, e.g., STEVE RATNER, THE THIN JUSTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A 
MORAL RECKONING OF THE LAW OF NATIONS (2015) (discussing the sovereign 
equality of nation norms as legal and moral principles). 
37. See Rossi, supra note 29, at 80. 
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implementing objectives consistent with the national interests of both 
countries.38 
Consistent with a constructivist perspective,39 Chile and Bolivia 
must accept that their prejudices of each other have influenced their 
international bilateral relations and their territorial disputes to the 
disadvantage of both.40 Recognition of the value of the differences 
between the neighboring countries will enrich and help manifest their 
common destiny. A recognition of the historical importance of 
indigenous peoples’ contributions to the wellbeing of both countries 
can provide a new foundation for understanding of their national 
interests. A fresh approach is needed for Chile and Bolivia to resolve 
their conflicts and promote economic integration processes for the 
benefit of both countries. 
III. THE TERRITORY OF BOLIVIA AND CHILE, THE INCA EMPIRE, AND 
THE UTI POSSIDETIS PRINCIPLE 
It is essential to understand the place of indigenous people, such as 
the Aymara, Mapuche, and Quechua in Bolivia and Chile, to fully 
comprehend the concept of sovereignty in the context of the Bolivia-
Chile conflict. An indigenous perspective regarding the Bolivia-Chile 
conflict must consider the historical characteristics of the territory 
under dispute. 
The Inca Empire was sovereign over the territories that now 
constitute the Atacama Desert.41 The survivors of the Inca Empire are 
now the Aymara, Quechua, Mapuche, and other indigenous people of 
Bolivia and Chile.42 
 
38. See generally MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 1–33 (1996) (analyzing the concept of national interest). 
39. See generally Sarina They, Introducing Constructivism in International 
Relations Theory, E-INT’L REL., February 23, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/72842. 
40. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 139–54 (2016) (analyzing the constructivist perspectives in 
international relations). 
41.  See John Hyslop & Mario Rivera, An Expedition on the Inca Road in the 
Atacama Desert, 37 ARCHAEOLOGY 33, 33 (1984). 
42. See Indigenous Latin America in the Twenty-First Century: The First 
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Tiwanaku was one of the most advanced indigenous pre-Incan 
civilizations, which shaped the cultures and territories of what is now 
Bolivia and Chile, including Atacama, a coastal desert.43 Before the 
Spanish conquest of the New World, indigenous peoples were the 
owners of territories like the one under dispute between Chile and 
Bolivia. With regard to the ownership of the coast of Atacama by 
indigenous people, Diremar (Strategic Management for Maritime 
Vindication) states: 
The bonds connecting the Andean region with the coast of Atacama 
date back to ancient times when indigenous territories were 
connected permanently to the ocean. During its expansionist phase, 
the Tiwanaku culture built at least seven settlements in the Azapa 
Valley, right along the Pacific coast. In the southwestern part of its 
dominion, the Inca Empire stretched as far as the Atacama 
Desert. . . . These bonds were respected under colonial rule, which 
explains why Bolivia was founded in possession of a vast and 
wealthy seacoast in the Atacama region. Bolivia exercised 
sovereignty over this territory until 1879, when the Chilean invasion 
changed the country’s geography and history.44 
Considering the descendants of indigenous peoples, original 
owners of Atacama, are still an important part of the populations of 
Bolivia and Chile, it is essential to understand their views and interests. 
This is the case because Spanish conquerors took away their original 
territories, including Atacama, and exploited their natural resources.45 
Indeed, “[t]o say that Bolivia, Chile, or Peru first owned the land, and 
that it was taken from them, ignores the fact that land ownership is itself 
an artificial construct. The natives were there before any modern 
 
the number of indigenous populations in Bolivia and Chile) [hereinafter WORLD 
BANK GROUP]. 
43. See Kelly J. Knudson, Tiwanaku Influence in the South-Central Andes: 
Strontium Isotope Analysis and Middle Horizon Migration, 19 LATIN AM. ANTIQUITY 
3, 6 (2008) (discussing the influence of Tiwanaku on the territory of Atacama). 
44. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT FOR 
MARITIME VINDICATION - DIREMAR, THE BOOK OF THE SEA 15 (2015) [hereinafter 
DIREMAR]. 
45. See PAUL J. ZWIER, PRINCIPLED NEGOTIATION AND MEDIATION IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL ARENA, TALKING WITH EVIL 223–24 (2013). 
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nation-states with defined boundaries existed.”46 The people that 
owned the Atacama Desert were part of the Inca Empire. To 
comprehend the importance of this fundamental historical fact, it is 
necessary to know the historical background of the original owners of 
the territory under current dispute between Bolivia and Chile. No 
history of the region would be complete without recognizing the 
influence of the Inca Empire as the leader of the Andean civilization.47 
The Incas had a high level of economic and political power, which 
they used to conquer and colonize other indigenous nations. Although 
there are different theories about the origins of the Incas, there is 
consensus among scholars that the civilization of Tiwanaku preceded 
and influenced the formation of the Inca Empire.48 A diversity of 
nations were part of the Andean civilization, both before and after the 
establishment of the Inca Empire, including the Colla, Lupaca, 
Omasuyu, and Pacaje.49 The power of the Inca Empire was manifest in 
its economic, cultural, political, normative, and military development. 
50 The production and distribution of food, sophisticated constructions 
of roads and the creation of beautiful art, and other cultural expressions 
were examples of the positive aspects of Inca society. Among the 
tangible elements of power, the territory and population of a nation are 
important.51 Regarding the Inca domain: 
At the time of the Spanish Conquest in A.D.1532, the majority of the 
vast territory of Andean South America had been united into a single 
 
46. Id. at 223. 
47. See, e.g.,  HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS, THE 
STRUGGLE FOR POWER AND PEACE (1951) (To determine the power and influence of 
nations, it is important to consider military, political, economic, and other aspects. For 
Morgenthau, a classic exponent of realism, the elements of national power are 
geography, natural resources, military preparedness, industrial capacity, population, 
national character, national morale and the quality of diplomacy). 
48. See, e.g., JOHN WAYNE JANUSEK, IDENTITY AND POWER IN THE ANCIENT 
ANDES 225 (2004). 
49. See, e.g., WALDEMAR ESPINOZA SORIANO, LOS INCAS, ECONOMÍA, 
SOCIEDAD Y ESTADO EN LA ERA DEL TAHUANTINSUYO (3d ed. 1997). 
50. See GEOFFREY W. CONRAD & ARTHUR A. DEMAREST, RELIGION AND 
EMPIRE: THE DYNAMICS OF AZTEC AND INCA EXPANSIONISM 36 (2005). 
51. See, e.g., Michael Barnett & Duvall Raymond, Power in International 
Politics, 59 INT’L ORG. 39, 39 (2005) (analyzing the concept of power and its 
elements). 
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political entity now commonly called the Inca Empire. Known to its 
rulers as Tawantinsuyu, meaning roughly ‘The Land of Four 
Quarters’ in the Inca language, this empire included parts of the 
modern countries of Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, 
and Chile.52 
Considering these historical facts, there was once a unity between 
the people of Bolivia Chile.53 Furthermore, despite the Spanish 
conquest and colonization of the New World, and the systematic efforts 
to destroy indigenous peoples and their cultures, the descendants of the 
Inca Empire have survived in both countries.54 
The Incas believed in the existence of many gods, such as Inti, 
Pachamama, and others.55 Specifically, the principles of reciprocity 
and duality were the foundations of the Inca worldview: 
The world was viewed as being balanced between a series of dual 
opposing forces. Contrasting forces encompassing such concepts as 
upper versus lower, light versus dark, wet versus dry, heat versus 
cold, male versus female, and so on, complemented each other, 
providing an equilibrium in which life could exist. . .The purpose of 
Andean religion was to delineate the basic divisions of the cosmos 
and maintain them in harmony through reciprocal exchange. . .56 
The Incas had fundamental normative principles such as ama llulla, 
ama sua, ama qhella (“do not be a thief,” “do not be a liar,” “do not be 
lazy”).57 The Incan Empire used religious narratives to accomplish 
normative and political objectives. The influence of the Inca, and other 
indigenous peoples’ worldviews, is still seen in social and political 
 
52. GORDON F. MCEWAN, THE INCAS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 3 (2006). 
53. Id. 
54. See WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42 (For the numbers and importance 
of indigenous people in Latin America). 
55. See generally MARÍA ROSTWOROWSKI, OBRAS COMPLETAS VII, 
ESTRUCTURAS ANDINAS DEL PODER, IDEOLOGÍA RELIGIOSA Y POLÍTICA (2007) 
(analyzing the Andean religious worldviews and its influence in political structures). 
56. See MCEWAN, supra note 52, at 137–38. 
57.  See, e.g., FEDERICO GENG DELGADO, HISTORIA DEL DERECHO DEL 
DERECHO PERUANO 30 (2005). 
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movements in Latin America including Bolivia and Chile.58 Concepts 
such as reciprocity, equilibrium, and the importance of mother earth, 
are part of the ancestral creed that has run with the land. The common 
identity and experiences of indigenous peoples, such as the Aymara, 
Mapuche, and Quechua, are seen in Bolivia and Chile.59 Their historical 
experience and their philosophical understandings can help find an 
original solution to the territorial dispute between the two countries. 
After the Spanish conquest of the Andean region of South America, 
indigenous territories were occupied, and indigenous populations were 
systematically assimilated and, in some cases, exterminated.60  Because 
of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World, indigenous 
peoples lost their territories. The uti possidetis legal principle was 
applied to determine the territorial boundaries of the countries of Latin 
America and created the conditions for territorial conflicts among Latin 
American countries.61 The uti possidetis principle has been applied in 
Latin America in the following way: 
To guard against contested boundary claims, emerging Latin 
American republics employed the principle of uti possidetis. The 
principle froze territorial title at the moment of independence, ‘no 
matter how arbitrary those boundaries may have been drawn.’ As a 
convenient means of quieting title, the principle ensured that colonial 
boundaries instantly became international boundaries for Latin 
America’s new republics. It proved a costly means of securing non-
violent transitions to sovereignty, and it has been criticized for its 
agnostic regard for the human populations disrupted by the territorial 
divisions.62 
 
58. See generally Salvador Martí Puig, The Emergence of Indigenous 
Movements in Latin America and Their Impact on the Latin American Political Scene: 
Interpretive Tools at the Local and Global Levels, 37 LATIN AM. PERSP. 74 (2010) 
(analyzing indigenous people in political processes). 
59. See generally C. Xavier Albó, Aymaras Entre Bolivia, Perú y Chile, 
19 ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS 43 (2000) (analyzing the Aymara people of South 
America). 
60. See generally David Maybury-Lewis, Genocide Against Indigenous 
Peoples, in ANNIHILATING DIFFERENCE: THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF GENOCIDE 45–53 
(Alexander Laban Hinton ed., 2002) (analyzing genocide in the conquest and 
colonization of nations). 
61. See Rossi, supra note 29. 
62. Id. at 54. 
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The Bolivian Republic applied the uti possidetis principle in its 
formation, after obtaining its independence from Spain in 1985.63 In 
1826, Bolivia was subdivided into provinces, including Atacama, 
which became part of the department of Potosi.64 Considering this 
reality, a potential solution to the Bolivia-Chile dispute could grant 
indigenous peoples of Chile and Bolivia shared sovereignty over parts 
of Atacama.65 This will enable Bolivia to have sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean, and will create a model of sustainable economic 
integration by recognizing the rights of indigenous peoples including 
their self-determination. 
Bolivia is one of the most indigenous countries in Latin America. 
According to the World Bank, there are 4.12 million indigenous 
peoples, which is 41% of the Bolivian population.66 According to the 
Chilean Census, in Chile, 12.8% of the population identify as 
indigenous. In that country, there are 2.185 million indigenous people. 
This includes the Mapuche (79.8 %), Aymara (7.2 %), and Diaguita 
(4.1 %).67 Regarding the Mapachu indigenous population of Chile, “the 
Mapuche were the most successful indigenous group in the Americas 
at resisting Spanish colonialism, maintaining an independent existence 
in their homelands until conquered by Chile’s violent ‘pacification’ 
campaign in 1883. More recently, the Mapuche have also been the most 
active indigenous group in Chile . . . .”68 
The Spanish conquest and colonization of the New World were 
characterized by the disregard of the sovereignty of indigenous political 
communities.69 This was consistent with the views of Spanish 
government officials and some scholars that believed in the ethnic 
“natural” inferiority of indigenous peoples and the right of Spain to take 
 
63. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 15. 
64. Id. 
65. See Rossi, supra note 29. 
66. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42, at 25. 
67. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA, 2DA ENTREGA RESULTADOS 
DEFINITIVOS CENSO 2017, http://www.censo2017.cl/wp-
content/uploads/2018/05/presentacion_de_la_segunda_entrega_de_resultados_censo
2017.pdf. 
68. See Funk, supra note 10. 
69. See generally AARON M. SHATZMAN, THE OLD WORLD, THE NEW WORLD, 
AND THE CREATION OF THE MODERN WORLD, 1400–1650: AN INTERPRETIVE HISTORY 
63–108 (2013). 
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over their territories. Describing what happened in that historical 
context in Bolivia, Diremar (Strategic Management for Maritime 
Vindication) stated: 
The Spanish crown established a new type of political administrative 
organization in America, creating Viceroyalties and Captaincies-
General. The Viceroyalty of Peru was created in 1542 and was 
divided into Royal Audiences, one of which was the Royal Audience 
of Charcas (today Bolivia) . . . which comprised the Atacama District 
and its coast as part of its jurisdiction.70 
In 1776, the Viceroyalty of Río de La Plata was created.71 
Subsequently, the Royal Audience of Charcas, including the Atacama 
region, became part of its jurisdiction. 72 However, this did not last very 
long. In 1782, the Viceroyalty was fragmented in diverse administrative 
units, such as Potosi, which included the Atacama coastal land.73 
Although the many redistributions of territorial administrative 
jurisdictions, after the formation of Latin American countries, the 
original territories, such as the Atacama coastal territory, originally 
belonged to indigenous communities.74 Bolivia and Chile must 
recognize the injustices of the Spanish conquest and colonization of the 
New World against indigenous communities and ensure the 
participation of indigenous communities in the resolution of their 
territorial disputes. Unlike in previous historical contexts, the rights of 
indigenous peoples are globally recognized in international normative 
instruments, including the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
People75 and the American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
 





75. See G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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Peoples.76 These international legal sources recognize the self-
determination and sovereignty of indigenous peoples.77 
IV. THE ORIGINS OF THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE, THE 
LEAGUE OF NATIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES 
The lack of fulfillment of bilateral treaties characterizes the 
international relations between Chile and Bolivia.78 It not only 
demonstrates the close relationship between power politics and 
international law, but also how power can undermine the just territorial 
aspiration of military weak sovereign states such as Bolivia.79 Since its 
independence from Spain in 1865, Bolivia has had access to the Pacific 
Ocean. However, it lost its territory in an unjust war with Chile.80 
Recognizing the importance of access to coastal lands, in 1866, both 
countries signed a bilateral treaty regarding the demarcation of their 
coastal borders,81 which was later reaffirmed in the Treaty of Limits 
between Bolivia and Chile of 1874.82 
Unfortunately, in 1879, Chile started the War of the Pacific against 
Bolivia and Peru and occupied Bolivia’s coastal territories.83 
Describing the end of the war and the establishment of peaceful 
relations between Bolivia and Chile, the I.C.J. opined: 
Hostilities between Bolivia and Chile came to an end with the Truce 
Pact, signed in 1884 in Valparaíso. Under the terms of the Pact, 
Chile, inter alia, was to continue to govern the coastal region. As a 
 
76. See G.A. Res. 2888, American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (June 15, 2016). 
77. See Glenn T. Morris, In Support of the Right of Self-Determination for 
Indigenous Peoples under International Law, 29 GER. Y.B. INT’L L. 277, 308 (1986) 
(analyzing the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples). 
78. See Rossi, supra note 29. 
79. See Michael C. Williams, Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: 
Hans Morgenthau, Classical Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics, 
58 INT’L ORG.  633 (2004) (analyzing realism and power politics in international 
relations). 
80. See, e.g., MARK EVANS, JUST WAR THEORY: A REAPPRAISAL 203–22 (2005) 
(analyzing the concepts of just and unjust wars). 
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result of these events, Bolivia lost control over its Pacific coast. In 
1895, a Treaty on the Transfer of Territory was signed between 
Bolivia and Chile, but never entered into force. It included provisions 
for Bolivia to regain access to the sea, subject to Chile acquiring 
sovereignty over certain territories. On 20 October 1904, the Parties 
signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship . . . which officially ended 
the War of the Pacific as between Bolivia and Chile. Under that 
Treaty, which entered into force on 10 March 1905, the entire 
Bolivian coastal territory became Chilean and Bolivia was granted a 
right of commercial transit through Chilean ports. The Court notes 
that, since the conclusion of the 1904 Peace Treaty, both States have 
made a number of declarations and several diplomatic exchanges 
have taken place between them regarding the situation of Bolivia vis-
à-vis the Pacific Ocean.84 
The ruling elites of Bolivia and Chile disregarded the interest of 
essential sectors of their populations including the original owners of 
the territory under dispute. Indigenous peoples in Chile and Bolivia 
were not consulted, nor did they participate in the negotiations and 
conclusion of the Peace Treaty of 1904 or any other treaties regarding 
the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute.85 Considering the socio-political 
implications and economic impact of the Bolivians’ loss of its access to 
the Pacific Ocean, the interests of indigenous people should have been 
considered in the negotiating processes and conclusion of treaties 
between Chile and Bolivia.86 
The international relations between Bolivia and Chile have failed 
to follow the norms of international law, which condemn use of military 
force to resolve disputes.87 For example, on August 6, 1874, Chile and 
Bolivia signed a treaty to recognize their territorial boundaries.88 A 
Protocol to this agreement selected arbitration as the means for 
resolving disputes related to the treaty implementation.89 Despite this 
legal commitment, on February 14, 1879, Chile invaded Bolivian 
 
84. Id. at 1. 
85. See id. 
86. See infra Part V.B. 
87. See generally DIREMAR, supra note 44. 
88. Id. at 19. 
89. Id. 
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territory and annexed the Antofagasta port.90 Regarding this historical 
context, Diremar summarized that: 
Bolivia was dragged into a conflagration it had neither sought nor 
desired and, forced to defend its sovereignty, pursuant to the Treaty 
of Defensive Alliance concluded with Peru in 1873, along with its 
ally it tried to stop the advance of the Chilean troops which 
eventually occupied all of Bolivia’s Litoral, the Peruvian provinces 
of Tarapacá, Tacna and Arica and even the Peruvian capital city of 
Lima.91 
A peaceful means for the resolution of the territorial dispute 
happened at the League of Nations. Regarding the importance of the 
resolution of its landlocked situation, Bolivia stated its case at the 1919 
Paris Peace conference, and at the League of Nations.92 In response to 
this, in 1922, Manuel Rivas Vicuña, Chile’s delegate, expressed Chile’s 
willingness to negotiate with Bolivia.93 
Frank B. Kellogg, who was a mediator in a territorial dispute 
between Chile and Peru, attempted to resolve the Bolivia-Chile 
territorial dispute.94 On November 30, 1926, he proposed to grant 
Bolivia the territories of Tacna and Arica.95 In a memorandum sent to 
Frank B. Kellogg, Chile expressed its agreement to grant a stripe of 
territory and a port to Bolivia.96 
Since the late nineteenth century, the O.A.S. has provided a forum 
to find a peaceful resolution to the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. In 
1970, the O.A.S. General Assembly issued Resolution 426, which 
recommended that Chile and Bolivia negotiate so Bolivia may have a 
“free and sovereign territorial connection with the Pacific Ocean.” 97 
 
90. Id. at 30. 
91. Id. 
92.  Id. at 25 (Bolivia was a signatory of the Peace of Versailles); Treaty of 
Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles, 1919), June 28, 1919, 2 Bevans 43, 225 
Consol. T.S. 188, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/us-treaties/bevans/m-ust000002-
0043.pdf. 
93. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 25. 
94. Id. at 27. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Organization of American States G.A. Res. 426, OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2 
(October 22–31, 1979). 
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The O.A.S. passed two other resolutions in 1980 and 1981, 
recommending that Chile and Bolivia negotiate a peaceful resolution 
regarding Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.98 In 1983, 
the O.A.S. General Assembly adopted Resolution 686, which both 
Bolivia and Chile voted in favor of. The resolution encouraged both 
countries “to begin a process of rapprochement and strengthening of 
friendship of the Bolivian and Chilean peoples, directed toward 
normalizing their relations and overcoming the difficulties that separate 
them, including, especially, a formula for giving Bolivia a sovereign 
outlet to the Pacific Ocean.”99 
It is evident that Bolivia has relied on international law, including 
bilateral agreements with Chile, to resolve its lack of access to the 
Pacific Ocean. Bolivia has also attempted to facilitate negotiations with 
Chile through international organizations, such as the League of 
Nations and the O.A.S., to resolve its territorial disputes with Chile. The 
O.A.S. has continued to provide an institutional framework to find 
solutions to Bolivia’s landlocked status, while taking into consideration 
its historical international relations with Chile. Future efforts at the 
O.A.S. should also consider the role of indigenous peoples in the 
diplomatic resolution of conflicts between Bolivia and Chile. 
A. The Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. 
Chile) Case at the I.C.J. 
Maintaining the recent trend of pursuing negotiations of territorial 
disputes through international mechanisms, Bolivia decided to initiate 
proceedings before the I.C.J.to gain access to the Pacific Ocean. On 
March 23, 2011, Bolivia’s first indigenous President, Evo Morales 
Ayma, announced the initiation of these proceedings: 
Despite 132 years of dialogue and efforts, Bolivia does not have a 
sovereign access to the Pacific . . . . In recent decades[,] and 
particularly in recent years, International Law has made great 
 
98. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 88; Organization of American States G.A. Res. 
481, OEA/Ser.P/X.0.2 (Nov. 19–27, 1980); Organization of American States G.A. 
Res. 560, OEA/Ser.P/XI.0.2 (Oct. 2–11, 1981). 
99. Organization of American States G.A. Res. 686, OEA/Ser. P/XIII.O.2 (Nov. 
14–18, 1983). 
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progress; there are now tribunals and courts which sovereign States 
can appeal to and claim or demand what is rightfully theirs.100 
Bolivia believed that the I.C.J. established a legal obligation for 
Chile to negotiate a solution to provide Bolivia access to the Pacific 
Ocean. Bolivia, a State with a weak military, relied on the legal strength 
of an international adjudicatory body to persuade Chile, the more 
militant State, to change its diplomatic position and agree to negotiate 
a peaceful solution to the territorial dispute. 
Bolivia and Chile recognized the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction over territorial 
disputes in the American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (“ATPS”), also 
known as the “Pact of Bogotá.”101 On April 24, 2013, Bolivia filed an 
application at the I.C.J. regarding Chile’s obligation to negotiate a 
solution to the territorial dispute with Bolivia.102 In its application, 
Bolivia asserted that Chile had a legal obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s 
sovereign access to the sea.103 The basis for this obligation is 
international “agreements, diplomatic practice and a series of 
declarations attributable to [Chile’s] highest-level representatives, to 
negotiate a sovereign access to the sea for Bolivia.”104 One of Bolivia’s 
main objectives was to demonstrate Chile’s “obligation to negotiate in 
good faith with Bolivia in order to reach an agreement granting Bolivia 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.”105 
On July 15, 2014, Chile raised a preliminary objection to the 
I.C.J.’s jurisdiction. The I.C.J. rejected Chile’s preliminary objection 
by applying Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogotá treaty.106 The Court 
decided it had jurisdiction through the Pact of Bogotá since the case 
was solely about whether Chile was obligated to negotiate with Bolivia 
and whether Chile breached the treaty, and would not determine the 
States’ sovereignty. 
 
100. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 47. 
101. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), Apr. 30, 1948, 30 
U.N.T.S. 55, O.A.S.T.S. 17 & 16. 
102. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564. 
103. DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 50. 
104. Id. 
105. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 1. 
106.  Id.; American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 
101, art. XXXI. 
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Bolivia’s case focused on the principle of pactum de negotiando 
including the interpretation that a fundamental component of 
negotiations is that they are conducted in good faith.107 The Court ruled 
against Bolivia, finding that Chile had no legal obligation to negotiate 
in good faith a sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean for Bolivia.108 
In its reasoning, the I.C.J. rejected Bolivia’s argument regarding 
bilateral agreements as a source of Chile’s legal obligation to 
negotiate.109 Bolivia argued that Chile’s obligation was embodied in 
bilateral agreements, including the minutes of  a meeting between 
Bolivia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Chile’s Minister 
Plenipotentiary (January 1920); the exchange of diplomatic notes 
between Bolivia and Chile (1950) and of a memorandum from the 
Chilean Ambassador to Bolivia (1961); the Charaña Declaration, 
signed by the Bolivian and Chilean presidents (February 1975); 
communiqués between the Chilean and Bolivians secretaries of 
state(November 1986); a joint declaration between the Bolivian and 
Chilean secretaries of state (February 2000); and a bilateral Bolivia-
Chile working group’s thirteen-point agenda (2006).110  The I.C.J. did 
not find a legal obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean in any of these bilateral instruments.111 
The I.C.J. also did not find a legal obligation to negotiate with 
Bolivia in Chile’s unilateral acts.112 The I.C.J. rejected Bolivia’s 
arguments based on the doctrine of acquiescence. It noted that Bolivia 
“has not identified any declaration which required a response or 
reaction on the part of Chile in order to prevent an obligation from 
 
107. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 48. 
108. Press Release, International Court of Justice, Obligation to Negotiate 
Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile): The Court Finds that the Republic of 
Chile Did Not Undertake a Legal Obligation to Negotiate a Sovereign Access to the 
Pacific Ocean for the Plurinational State of Bolivia, I.C.J. Press Release 2018/49, 1 
(October 1, 2018) [hereinafter International Court of Justice]. 
109. Id. at 2. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1. 
112. Id. at 2. 
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arising.”113 The Court further rejected arguments based on estoppel,114 
and stated: 
Although there have been repeated representations by Chile of its 
willingness to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the sea, such 
representations do not point to an obligation to negotiate. Bolivia has 
not demonstrated that it changed its position to its own detriment or 
to Chile’s advantage, in reliance on Chile’s representations.115 
The court rejected Bolivia’s arguments based on the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations because it is a principle restricted to the field of 
foreign direct investments between host countries and foreign 
investors.116 The I.C.J. indicated that Article 2.3 of the U.N. Charter 
and Article 3 of the O.A.S. Charter express a general obligation to 
resolve disputes by peaceful means, but they do not require the parties 
to use a specific mechanism like negotiation.117 
Regarding the eleven O.A.S. General Assembly resolutions on the 
issue of Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean, the I.C.J. 
reasoned: “. . . none of the relevant resolutions indicates that Chile is 
under an obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean. Moreover, as both Parties acknowledge, resolutions of 
the General Assembly of the OAS are not per se binding and cannot be 
the source of an international obligation.”118  The I.C.J. rejected 
Bolivia’s claim regarding Chile’s legal obligation to negotiate because 
of an accumulative effect of all the sources that demonstrate the 
existence of such obligation. Specifically, the I.C.J. said, “given that its 
analysis shows that no obligation to negotiate Bolivia’s sovereign 
access to the Pacific Ocean has arisen for Chile from any of the invoked 
legal bases taken individually, a cumulative consideration of the various 
bases cannot add to the overall result.”119 
 
113. Id. 
114. See generally Christopher Brown, A Comparative and Critical Assessment 
of Estoppel in International Law, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 369 (1996) (explaining the 
doctrine of estoppel in international law). 
115. International Court of Justice, supra note 108, at 3. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 4. 
119. Id. 
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Contrary to its overall reasoning regarding the lack of Chile’s legal 
obligation to negotiate in good faith an access to the Pacific Ocean for 
Bolivia, the I.C.J. also recognized the existence of a historical conflict 
between Chile and Bolivia, and the importance of having negotiations 
to resolve it. Regarding this, the I.C.J. indicated: 
Nevertheless, the Court’s finding should not be understood as 
precluding the Parties from continuing their dialogue and exchanges, 
in a spirit of good neighborliness, to address the issues relating to the 
landlocked situation of Bolivia, the solution to which they have both 
recognized to be a matter of mutual interest. With willingness on the 
part of the Parties, meaningful negotiations can be undertaken.120 
As a matter of common interest, the I.C.J.’s recognition of the 
historical efforts to resolve the landlocked problem of Bolivia and its 
encouragement to continue to address this issue provides a foundation 
for seeking original and effective means for the peaceful resolution of 
the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Besides adjudicatory means, in the 
resolution of international disputes there are other mechanisms for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, including mediation and conciliation, 
which will be considered in this Article. 
B. Dissenting Opinions and the Negotiation Option 
Regarding the decision of the Bolivia-Chile case, the President of 
the I.C.J., Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, recognized the existence of 
historically consistent interactions and declarations between Chile and 
Bolivia. He believed these actions reflected efforts, made in good faith, 
to obtain a negotiated solution to Bolivia’s landlocked problem.121 
Consistent with this view, in his declaration in the case records, he 
wrote: 
It is possible, as is the case here, that the Court may reject the relief 
requested by an applicant because it is not sufficiently founded on 
law. This may satisfy the judicial function of the Court, but it may 
not put to an end the issues which divide the Parties or remove all the 
uncertainties affecting their relations. It is not inappropriate, in such 
 
120. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564. 
121. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 566–68 (Oct. 1) (Declaration of 
President Yusuf). 
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circumstances, for the Court to draw the attention of the Parties to 
the possibility of exploring or continuing to explore other avenues 
for the settlement of their dispute in the interest of peace and 
harmony amongst them.122 
Consistent with his written statement, Judge Yusuf also made a 
public statement in which he highlighted the fact that the I.C.J. 
recognized the existence of a history of negotiations between Chile and 
Bolivia to resolve the landlocked Bolivian problem.123 He said that “for 
the Court, these periodic exchanges and statements of the Parties 
reflected attempts made in good faith to address the landlocked 
situation of Bolivia.”124 Considering the resolution of the territorial 
dispute is of mutual interests of Chile and Bolivia, he opined: “This 
recognition by the Parties of the importance of the issue, paired with 
their willingness to resolve it, may provide the basis for a meaningful 
solution to be identified in the future.”125 
Judge Yusuf recognized that the decision of the I.C.J. was limited 
to the arguments presented in the case. The most important part of the 
declaration recognizes that the positivist legal analysis of the I.C.J. did 
not end the territorial dispute between Bolivia and Chile, and that the 
I.C.J. properly requested both countries to continue to find a mechanism 
for the resolution of their territorial dispute. 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Patrick Lipton Robinson 
recognized Chile’s legal obligation to negotiate a solution to the 
territorial dispute regarding Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific 
Ocean.126 He believes that the historical agreements between the 
parties, including the Trucco Memorandum and the Declaration of 
Charaña, are evidence of the creation of a legal obligation for Chile to 
 
122. Id. at 567. 
123. H.E. Abdulqawi Ahmed Yusuf, President of the International Court of 





126. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 569–98 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion 
of Robinson, J.), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/153-20181001-
JUD-01-02-EN.pdf. 
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negotiate with Bolivia.127 Consistent with this reasoning, he wrote the 
I.C.J. “should therefore have granted Bolivia a declaration that Chile 
has a legal obligation to negotiate directly with Bolivia to find a formula 
or solution that will enable Bolivia to have sovereign access to the 
Pacific Ocean.”128 
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Nawaf Salam analyzed the 
exchange of notes, between Bolivia and Chile, as a means to create an 
international agreement.129 He wrote that like in the Qatar v. Bahrain 
case, the I.C.J. should have recognized the formation of an international 
agreement by the exchange of diplomatic notes between Bolivia and 
Chile.130 Contrary to the reasoning of the majority opinion, Judge 
Salam believes that documents including the Trucco Memorandum and 
the Charaña Declaration, are evidence that “Chile and Bolivia were 
bound by a consistent obligation to negotiate on granting the latter 
sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean.”131 He used the Qatar v. Bahrain 
case as an example of the fact that international agreements can be done 
in diverse forms.132 According to Judge Salam: 
It is evident from the wording of the Notes exchanged that, at the 
time they were drafted, the two States considered that negotiations 
with a view to concluding an agreement that would confer reciprocal 
benefits on both Parties were the only feasible way of attempting to 
satisfy Bolivia’s aspirations. It is also clear from the terms of the 
Notes that they express the core of the undertaking to which the 
Parties had consented, namely to ‘formally enter into direct 
negotiations.’133 
 
127. Id. at 598. 
128. Id. 
129. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶¶ 599–606 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion 
of Salam, J.), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/153-20181001-
JUD-01-03-EN.pdf. 
130. See Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and 
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgement, 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 40 (March 15), available at 
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/87/087-19911011-ORD-01-00-
EN.pdf (discussing the reasoning of the I.C.J. in the Qatar v. Bahrain case). 
131. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Salam, supra note 129, at 604. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 601. 
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Regarding the importance of continuing to negotiate a solution to 
the Bolivia-Chile dispute, ad hoc Judge Yves Daudet highlighted that 
the I.C.J. decision recognizes the international dispute regarding 
Bolivia’s sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean is a pending issue. 
Concerning paragraph 176 of the I.C.J. decision which expresses this 
view, he wrote: 
[T]he Court’s concern is that the dispute should not persist and that 
its decision should not be understood as being the end of the matter, 
allowing things to remain as they are. In this regard, while hard for 
Bolivia, the Judgment could, if the Parties so wish, prompt a return 
to negotiations, which would not be imposed but desired by both 
sides with a renewed spirit.134 
The I.C.J. judges’ dissenting opinions in the Obligation to 
Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) case and 
paragraph 176 of the I.C.J. decision demonstrate the importance of 
continuing diplomatic negotiations between Chile and Bolivia to find a 
solution to Bolivia’s landlocked problem. Mediation and conciliation 
are possible mechanisms to accomplish this objective. In the next 
section of this Article, I will analyze the efficacy of alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms for the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. 
V. AN INTEGRATIVE NORMATIVE APPROACH FOR THE RESOLUTION OF 
THE BOLIVIA-CHILE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE 
Considering the complex historical and political characteristics of 
the Bolivia-Chile conflict and the failure of the I.C.J.’s legal positivism 
approach to contribute to its resolution, fundamental principles of 
global justice including ex aequo et bono need to become a foundation 
for its resolution. Regarding this principle, Leon Trakman, an 
experienced international relations law professor, opined that “[t]he 
ancient concept ex aequo et bono holds that adjudicators should decide 
disputes according to that which is ‘fair’ and in ‘good conscience.’”135  
Specifically, in international law, “[i]f the adjudicative decision is to be 
 
134. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 620 (Oct. 1) (Dissenting Opinion of 
Judge Ad Hoc Daudet), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/153/153-
20181001-JUD-01-04-EN.pdf. 
135. Leon Trakman, Ex Aequo et Bono: Demystifying an Ancient Concept, 8 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 621, 621 (2008). 
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‘fair,’ it must be fair against the background of rational actors 
exercising their free will.”136 
Consistent with rational ideas of fairness, Chile and Bolivia have 
an obligation consistent with their national interests to obtain a solution 
to Bolivia’s landlocked situation. This is also consistent with 
fundamental principles of global justice, including the peaceful 
coexistence between sovereign states, and respect for fundamental, 
individual, and collective human rights.137 To diminish the mutual 
distrust between Bolivia and Chile, and to accomplish objectives 
consistent with global justice, the interests of indigenous peoples and 
civil sectors of society of both countries, must be considered. Moreover, 
any possibility of a violent resolution to this conflict must be 
prevented.138 
Consistent with Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter, rather than relying 
on power politics and the potential use of military force, Chile and 
Bolivia have the legal obligation to resolve their dispute through 
peaceful means.139 As mentioned above, Article 33 of the U.N. Charter 
requires sovereign states to resolve their disputes through peaceful 
means including negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and 
judicial settlement.140 
The failure of the I.C.J. to contribute to a negotiated solution to a 
territorial dispute is evidence of the importance of considering 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in the resolution of 
international disputes between sovereign states.141 A case can be made 
for rethinking the structure of international dispute resolution by 
focusing not only on adjudicatory mechanism, but also on mediation, 
conciliation, and other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. This 
 
136. Id. at 637. 
137. See RATNER, supra note 36 (describing global justice principles). 
138. See generally Wehner, supra note 14 (discussing the effect of distrust on 
the Boliva-Chile dispute). 
139. U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 3. 
140. Id. art 33. 
141. See generally Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the 
Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2010) 
(discussing the potential resolution of international disputes through alternative 
resolution mechanisms). 
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analysis applies well to the case of the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
dispute.142 
A glaring flaw in the current international dispute resolution system 
is that “it overlooks the value and institutional development of 
mediation, despite states’ preference for mediation in certain 
contexts.”143 Also, it does not have a structure to enable the integration 
of diverse methods of dispute resolution.144 Regarding the shortfalls of 
adjudicatory means for the resolution of international disputes: 
[A]djudication is not designed to address extra-legal issues. Its 
limited justiciability makes adjudication poorly equipped to resolve 
complex, multi-issue disputes involving political, social, 
environmental, and ethical interests. Often a court will issue an 
opinion that fails to resolve key issues in the case.145   
The limitations of the international adjudicatory process were seen 
in the I.C.J.’s decision in the Bolivia-Chile case, which did not provide 
adequate solutions for the resolution of one of the most important 
territorial disputes in Latin America.146 Considering this reality, it is 
essential to find just and creative mechanisms for the resolution of the 
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute, including the integration of diverse 
means. To illustrate of the effectiveness of an integrative approach: 
[I]n the [I.C.J.] Frontier Dispute case, the governments of Mali and 
Burkina Faso reached a cease-fire and worked to resolve their 
underlying disputes through judicial settlement by the [I.C.J.] and a 
mediation like process that involved local stakeholders. This 
 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 13. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 16–17 (“For example, despite the ICJ’s decision regarding Slovakia 
and Hungary’s dispute over a project to build barrages in the Danube River, the matter 
remains unresolved. In the Nuclear Tests cases, and other cases, the ICJ was heavily 
criticized for leaving the question of legality of nuclear testing, a politicized matter, 
undecided, and for failing to identify legal principles upon which environmental 
protection could be based.”). 
146. See generally Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564. 
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combination of rights-based and interest-based methods brought an 
end to the armed conflict and the ongoing disputes.147 
In paragraph 176 of the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the 
Pacific Ocean (Bolivia v. Chile) case opinion, the I.C.J. encouraged 
Chile and Bolivia to continue their negotiations to find a solution to 
Bolivia’s landlocked situation.148 This perspective is further supported 
by the reasoning of Judge Yusuf and the dissenting judges’ opinions in 
the Bolivia v. Chile case. The I.C.J. can encourage a diplomatic solution 
to the territorial dispute by implementing an international mediation 
process between the two countries. 
The I.C.J. decision demonstrates the Court’s limitations in 
providing effective solutions consistent with international law. In order 
to make the international dispute resolution system more effective, the 
focus must be shifted to “embracing mediation and reducing the 
primacy of adjudication removes some authority from states as it 
promotes non-state actor participation in IDR processes. An integrated 
[International Dispute Resolution (“IDR”)] structure creates a 
decentralized substructure within the international legal system.”149 
Consistent with the integrative approach for international conflicts, the 
Inter-American system for dispute resolution provides a normative 
foundation for the peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
dispute. This foundation includes mediation, assistance, and 
conciliation. 
Bolivia and Chile are signatories to the American Treaty on Pacific 
Settlement (“ATPS”).150 In Article IX, this treaty recognizes good 
offices and mediation as means for conflict resolution, such as the 
Bolivia-Chile conflict.151 Countries, such as Costa Rica, which 
traditionally have facilitated the peaceful resolution of international 
conflicts can attempt to reinvigorate the negotiation between Bolivia 
and Chile. Pope Francis is an Argentinian citizen who knows the 
 
147. Spain, supra note 140, at 7. 
148. Bol. v. Chile, 2018 I.C.J. Reports ¶ 564. 
149. Spain, supra note 141, at 49. 
150. Organization of American States, Signatories and Ratifications to the 
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, DEPT. INT’L L., 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-42.html. 
151. See American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 
101, art. IX. 
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historical, political, and cultural characteristics of Bolivia and Chile.152 
He could utilize good offices to help Chile and Bolivia negotiate a 
peaceful solution to their territorial dispute. ATPS provides a 
foundation for Latin American countries to facilitate a mediated 
resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Regarding mediation as a 
means for the conflict resolution, Article XI of the ATPS states: 
The procedure of mediation consists in the submission of the 
controversy to one or more American Governments not parties to the 
controversy, or to one or more eminent citizens of any American 
State not a party to the controversy. In either case the mediator or 
mediators shall be chosen by mutual agreement between the 
parties.153 
Bolivia and Chile can agree to have Pope Francis, or other 
distinguished citizens of Latin America, act as mediators for their 
territorial disputes.154 Specifically, countries such as Costa Rica or 
Mexico can be mediators in the Bolivia-Chile dispute. Describing the 
functions of mediators, Article XII of the ATPS provides, “The 
functions of the mediator or mediators shall be to assist the parties in 
the settlement of controversies in the simplest and most direct manner, 
avoiding formalities and seeking an acceptable solution.”155 
An integrative approach to the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile 
territorial conflict must recognize the I.C.J.’s inherent limitations and 
embrace other means for international dispute resolution. Mediation, 
conciliation, and good offices are alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms that will effectively resolve the Bolivia-Chile dispute. 
Further, an integrative perspective is consistent with the norms of the 
ATPS that recognize the importance of mediation, conciliation, and 
other alternative dispute resolution processes for the resolution of 
disagreements between Latin American countries. 
 
152. See MARTIN SCHLAG, THE BUSINESS FRANCIS MEANS: UNDERSTANDING 
THE POPE’S MESSAGE ON THE ECONOMY 48–97 (2017). 
153. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 101, 
art. XI. 
154. SCHLAG, supra note 152, at 48–97. 
155. American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 101, 
art. XII. 
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A. Pope Francis and U.N. Secretary General António Guterres as 
Mediators of the Bolivia-Chile Territorial Dispute 
Mediation is defined as “a form of third-party intervention by 
which an unbiased party convenes disputing parties, facilitates a 
process for communicating positions and underlying interests and 
promotes agreement formation.”156  Mediation has been an effective 
mechanism for national and international dispute resolution. Further, it 
is a major means for the resolution of disputes between those from 
different cultures.157 Additionally, mediation is an important method 
for the resolution of business disputes between juridical persons, 
including transnational corporations. For example, the Center of the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes uses mediation to resolve conflicts 
between transnational corporations and governments.158 Although not 
as frequently as in the business sector, mediation is also used in the 
resolution of territorial and other disputes between sovereign states. For 
example, consider China and Russia during the In the Amur River 
Dispute: 
[T]he underlying issue was an unclear boundary demarcation along 
a portion of the Amur River and several islands. Russia claimed that 
ownership rights were granted under the 1858 Treaty of Adigun and 
the 1860 Peking Treaty. Although seemingly a legal matter, the 
parties resolved the dispute through a joint field-mapping exercise of 
the disputed area where they agreed to divide the islands in half. The 
process, which involved mediation, worked so well that they 
followed a similar arrangement in the Argun River Dispute.159 
From another perspective, philosopher Paul Ricouer suggests the 
use of historical memory to facilitate mediation processes.160 This 
perspective applies well to the Bolivia-Chile conflict because there is a 
 
156. Spain, supra note 141, at 10. 
157. Elizabeth Birch, Practical and Cultural Aspects of International 
Mediation, 5 Y.B. ON INT’L ARB. 215, 216 (2017). 
158. International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Investor-State 
Mediation, Subpage to Services, WORLD BANK GROUP, 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/adr-mechanisms—mediation.aspx (last 
visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
159. Spain, supra note 141, at 25–26. 
160. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 124–25 (discussing Paul Ricouer). 
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well-documented negotiating history regarding the peaceful solution of 
Bolivia’s landlocked condition. The importance of historical memory 
can also be seen in the fact that both countries have a common history 
of unity before the Spanish conquest and colonization of the New 
World. Specifically, the Incas and other indigenous peoples were the 
original inhabitants of Chile and Bolivia.161 
Both countries have experienced military dictatorships acts of 
genocide against indigenous communities. Bolivia and Chile have 
experienced processes of national reconciliation and restoration of their 
respective democratic systems. Historical memory may remind 
Bolivians and Chileans, and their governments, that negotiations are 
meaningful steps toward a mutually beneficial agreement.162 
Regarding the principle approach to international negotiations and 
mediation, “[n]egotiation theorist[s] . . . emphasize an interest-based 
approach to negotiations instead of position bargaining . . . to focus on 
the underlying concerns of the parties instead of [focusing on] a 
defined, sometimes uncompromising objective.”163 Consistent with the 
principle approach, Bolivia and Chile should focus on the political and 
economic importance of improving their bilateral relations. Both 
countries must also understand their common destiny to live as 
neighboring countries, and they must acknowledge the fact that their 
territorial disputes have damaged mutually beneficial processes of 
economic integration. 
Mutual political forgiveness and reconciliation are fundamental 
factors in achieving a successful result in the Bolivia-Chile dispute. 
Specifically, success requires the participation of government officials, 
indigenous leaders, and civil society representatives in mediation 
processes. Public diplomacy should be an essential component in these 
types of efforts. Further, public diplomacy is essential to dispute 
resolution efforts.  Indigenous leaders from both countries can begin 
this process by showing a willingness to speak sincerely about 
indigenous interests. Similarly, academic leaders, scientists, and 
 
161. MCEWAN, supra note 52, at 3. 
162. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 126–43 (discussing using the integration of a 
historical approach, position bargaining and problem solving in international 
mediation processes). 
163. Id. at 126. 
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business leaders can also promote indigenous interests.164 An 
international institution can act as a mediator, facilitating a mutual and 
proper understanding of the interests of Bolivia and Chile. The U.N., 
the O.A.S., and the Catholic Church are examples of potential 
mediators. 
Pope Francis, given his understanding of the South American 
context and the importance of indigenous peoples in the region, is 
uniquely situated to mediate the territorial dispute between Bolivia and 
Chile. The Secretary General of the U.N., António Guterres, could also 
be an excellent impartial mediator for the conflict. The Beagle Channel 
case is a good example of a successful South America territorial dispute 
mediation: 
The Beagle Channel conflict had its origins in a long-standing 
disagreement over the contours of the Argentine–Chilean border. 
The core issue in this dispute was sovereignty over three barren 
islands to the south of Tierra del Fuego and the scope of the maritime 
jurisdiction associated with those islands.165 
The Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute centers on Bolivia’s sovereign 
access to the Pacific Ocean. Similarly, in the Beagle Channel dispute, 
military dictatorships in Chile and Argentina leveraged their territorial 
conflict to increase their domestic political influence by encouraging 
nationalist feelings and denigrating their opponent’s cultural and 
national identities. Additionally, geopolitical interests increased the 
conflict’s intensity. Indeed, “The military authorities of both countries 
had long regarded the southern zone as crucial to their long-term 
strategic objectives because of its three interoceanic passages—the 
Straits of Magellan, the Beagle Channel, and the Drake Passage.”166 
 
164. See generally Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and 
Histories, 616 ANNALS AM. ACAD.  POL. & SOC. SCI. 31–54 (2008) (analyzing 
public diplomacy). 
165. Mark Laudy, The Vatican Mediation of the Beagle Channel Dispute: Crisis 
Intervention and Forum Building, in WORD OVER WAR, MEDIATION AND 
ARBITRATION TO PREVENT DEADLY CONFLICT 295 (Melanie C. Greenberg, et. al, 
eds., 2000). 
166. Id. at 298. 
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Just as the Bolivia-Chile dispute, the Beagle Channel territorial dispute 
was a central priority of both countries’ foreign policies.167 
Before the Pope’s mediation of the Argentina-Chile dispute (1971-
1977), there was an arbitration process done by the British Crown. 
Specifically, “[t]he arbitral decision, officially announced on May 2, 
1977, established a boundary running roughly through the center of the 
Beagle Channel and extending to the east of the PNL island group. 
Thus, all three of the disputed islands were awarded to Chile.”168 
However, Argentina rejected the decision of the arbitral panel and 
declared it void. 
Chile rejected the British Crown’s decision. This increased tensions 
between the two countries. Military force became an increasingly likely 
resolution of the conflict.169 Chile sought a resolution by the I.C.J.  
However, Argentina, as a stronger military power, rejected this option 
and indicated that it might declare war if Chile seeks the I.C.J.’s 
assistance.170 
Pope Francis can appoint a personal envoy for good offices for the 
resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict. In the historical context of the 
Argentina-Chile conflict, Pope John Paul II sent a personal envoy to 
Buenos Aires and Santiago for good offices.171 A similar approach can 
be used to resolve the Bolivia-Chile conflict. Although a number of 
possible mediators were considered including, the king of Spain; Queen 
of England; and the Secretary General of the U.N., Kurt Waldheim, 
Pope John Paul II was elected as the best mediator for the Argentina-
Chile conflict.172 
One reason Pope John Paul II was the best mediator was because 
of the institutional reputation of the Vatican to have patience, 
understanding, and prudence in mediating processes.173 Moreover, 
 
167. Id. (“By the time of the papal intervention in late 1978, the conflict over 
the Beagle Channel had become the primary foreign policy imperative of both 
governments.”). 
168. Id. at 299. 
169. Id. at 300. 
170. Id. at 301 (“Chile once again proposed that the dispute be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice. The unofficial response from Buenos Aires was that 
Argentina would consider that course of action to be casus belli.”). 
171. Id. at 302. 
172. Id. at 304. 
173. Id. 
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“[t]he Pope, having a long-term perspective on his mission and being 
largely unaccountable to any interested constituencies, was almost 
certainly better suited to such a role than other heads of state.”174 
Considering the personal attributes of Pope Francis, and the 
institutional experience of the Vatican, the analysis regarding the 
reasons why the Pope John Paul II was chosen to mediate the Chile-
Argentina conflict, may similarly apply to Pope Francis to resolve the 
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. 
Similar to the Chile-Argentina conflict, the mediator of the Bolivia-
Chile conflict needs to have a deep understanding of the interests of 
both parties and needs to facilitate an increasing understanding of 
opposite interests of the parties in the conflict.175 The more Chile 
understands the Bolivian perspective, and Bolivia understands the 
Chilean perspective, the better the possibilities for the resolution of the 
conflict. The mediation process can create new value that benefits both 
sides.176 
A proper and mutual understanding of the issues was a central 
element of the success of the Argentina-Chile mediation.177 Like in the 
Beagle Channel case, the Vatican can initiate a good offices process to 
facilitate dialogue between Bolivia and Chile. The Vatican’s experience 
in mediating international disputes and Pope Francis’ South American 
origins, uniquely position the Vatican to provide good offices to 
facilitate Bolivia-Chile negotiations.178 
Another essential element of the successful mediation of the 
Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel dispute was Pope John Paul’s 
neutrality.179 Through his neutral mediation there came a mutually 
 
174. Id. at 304. 
175. See generally GARY FRIEDMAN & JACK HIMMELSTEIN, CHALLENGING 
CONFLICT, MEDIATION THROUGH UNDERSTANDING (2008) (discussing the 
importance of the understanding perspective regarding mediation of conflicts). 
176. See generally ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, BEYOND WINNING, NEGOTIATING TO 
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000) (providing a general analysis of the 
negotiation and the creations of value). 
177. See Laudy, supra note 165, at 310. 
178. See generally ALYNNA J. LYON, CHRISTINE A. GUSTAFSON & PAUL 
CHRISTOPHER MANUEL (EDS.), POPE FRANCIS AS A GLOBAL ACTOR WHERE POLITICS 
AND THEOLOGY MEET (2018) (analyzing Pope Francis’ views and actions). 
179. Lisa Lindsley, The Beagle Channel Settlement: Vatican Mediation 
Resolves a Century-Old Dispute, 29 J. CHURCH & ST. 435, 453 (1987); see also 
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beneficial agreement. The agreement recognized Argentine ships’ 
rights to passage, through internal waters of Chile, to the Strait of 
Magellan.180 A similar approach that implements the negotiating 
objectives of Bolivia and Chile can lead to a peaceful resolution of their 
territorial disputes. 
The global recognition of Pope John Paul II and the influence and 
perceived neutrality of the Catholic Church in Latin American countries 
were some reasons for the effective mediation of the Pope in the 
territorial dispute between Chile and Argentina on the Beagle 
Channel.181 “Pope John Paul II formally accepted the role of mediator 
on the basis that the Vatican would be a mediator not an arbiter; he 
pledged to ‘advise and assist’ the nations to reach an agreement. The 
Vatican was not empowered to judge the merits of the case.”182 In the 
current Latin America historical context, the Catholic Church can be an 
important factor in the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile conflict because 
Pope Francis has globally recognized moral authority and influence.183 
In November 2019, the Secretary General of the U.N. António 
Guterres, sent his personal representative, Jean Arnault, to mediate a 
political crisis in Bolivia.184 The conflicts between political forces that 
supported President Evo Morales and opposition forces could have 
ended in a tragic civil war.185 However, thanks to the mediation efforts 
of the Bolivian Catholic Church, the U.N., and the European Union, all 
parties of the conflict—including leaders of the political party 
Movement for Socialism (“M.A.S.”), such as the President of the 
 
Thomas Princen, International Mediation - The View from the Vatican, 3 NEGOT. J. 
347 (1987). 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 443. 
182. Id. at 445. 
183. See Lyon, Gustafson & Manuel, supra note 178 (analyzing Pope Francis’ 
views and actions). 
184. Statement, Mr. Jean Arnault of France - Personal Envoy of the Secretary-
General for Bolivia, U.N. SECRETARY-GENERAL (Nov. 14, 2019), 
https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/personnel-appointments/2019-11-14/mr-jean-
arnault-of-france-personal-envoy-of-the-secretary-general-for-bolivia. 
185. See, e.g., Anatoly Kurmanaev, Mónica Machicao & Ernesto Londoño, 
Military Calls on President to Step Down After Election Dispute in Bolivia, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 13, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/10/world/americas/bolivia-election-evo-
morales.html (discussing the Bolivia political crisis). 
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Senate, Ms. Eva Copa, and members of movements that overthrown 
President Evo Morales, including President Jeanine Añez—reached an 
agreement to have new presidential elections in Bolivia.186 
Consequently, the U.N. Secretary General could also offer good offices 
and could lead mediation efforts in the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
dispute.187   
U.N. Secretary Generals have been involved, using good offices, in 
resolution of international conflicts including the Cuban missile crisis, 
the Yemeni civil war, Iran-Iraq war, Afghanistan war, and Cambodian 
civil war.188 For example, the U.N. Secretary Generals’ good offices’ 
joint efforts with the O.A.S. in the Esquipulas II process was essential 
resolving conflicts in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
and Nicaragua.189  The U.N. and O.A.S. helped establish an agreement 
that included procedures and objectives for negotiations between the 
parties to the conflicts. Also, the U.N. and the O.A.S. were granted the 
authority to pursue the implementation of agreements reached as a 
result of the negotiation processes.190 
Another example of the U.N. Secretary General’s mediation efforts 
in Latin America occurred in Guatemala.191 Guatemala’s civil war was 
one of the most violent in the region and resulted in the death of around 
one hundred thousand people and thousands of disappearances.192 In 
1990, representatives of the U.N. Secretary General started to mediate 
 
186. Daniel Ramos, Bolivia’s dueling parties converge on new vote to calm 
political chaos, REUTERS (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
bolivia-election/bolivias-dueling-parties-converge-on-new-vote-to-calm-political-
chaos-idUSKBN1XO2C8. 
187. See Thomas M. Franck, The Secretary-General’s Role in Conflict 
Resolution: Past, Present and Pure Conjecture, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 360, 361 (1995) 
(regarding the authority of the U.N. Secretary General to contribute to the resolution 
of international disputes). 
188. Id. 
189. Permanent Rep. of Costa Rica to the U.N., Permanent Rep. of El Salvador 
to the U.N., Permanent Rep. of Guatemala to the U.N., & Permanent Rep. of 
Nicaragua to the U.N., Letter dated 27 August 1987 from the Permanent 
Representatives of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/42/521, S/19085 (Aug. 31, 
1987). 
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negotiations for the resolution of the conflict between the government 
of Guatemala and insurgency groups.193 These mediated negotiations 
bore fruit “[i]n January 1994, [when] the adversaries, negotiating under 
the Secretary-General’s auspices, had concluded a framework 
agreement which also provided for the UN to moderate future 
negotiations and verify compliance.”194   
As a result of the request, by sovereign states engaged in 
international disputes, the U.N. Secretary General established good 
offices efforts in the Rainbow Warrior case, the Guyana-Venezuela 
territorial dispute, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and in the 
Liberian conflict, among others.195 In the Bolivia-Chile conflict, the 
parties to the territorial dispute can request the U.N. Secretary General 
to mediate negotiations to free Bolivia from being landlocked. 
Chile has often expressed concerns for the protection of its national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity in efforts to resolve Bolivia’s 
landlocked situation.196 The U.N. Secretary General’s involvement in 
mediation could reduce this apprehension. In regard to the Secretary 
General’s contributions are significant because they were “the least 
intrusive, least expensive and frequently most successful form of UN 
peace-making has proven to be the diplomatic role of the Secretary-
General.”197 
Mediation and other mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of the 
Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute should be based on principles of global 
justice, including the equality of sovereign states and respect for 
fundamental human rights. Mediators that understand the interests of 
governments, the interests of civil society actors, and the indigenous 
peoples of Chile and Bolivia can help achieve a resolution rooted in 
global justice. The Beagle Channel mediation was successful because 
the moral authority of Pope John Paul II as the mediator. The 
Argentinian and Chilean people recognized the leadership and 
neutrality of the Pope, which created a strong public opinion support 
 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 369–70. 
195. Id. at 370, 379. 
196. See, e.g., DIREMAR, supra note 44, at 37. 
197. Franck, supra note 187, at 383. 
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for a peaceful resolution. The Bolivia-Chile conflict can be successfully 
resolved by taking a similar approach to mediation. 198 
B. Indigenous Peoples’ Diplomacy and International Conciliation as 
Necessary for the Resolution of the Bolivia-Chile Territorial Dispute 
According to the Preamble to the American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
[Recognizing] the rights of indigenous peoples are both essential and 
of historical significance to the present and future of the Americas; 
the important presence in the Americas of indigenous peoples and 
their immense contribution to development, plurality, and cultural 
diversity, and reiterating our commitment to their economic and 
social well-being, as well as the obligation to respect their rights and 
cultural identity; and that the existence of the indigenous cultures and 
peoples of the Americas is important to humanity.199 
The acknowledgment of the contributions of indigenous peoples of 
Latin America to the well-being of humankind, is a corollary that 
should also apply to the importance of indigenous peoples in leading 
public diplomacy efforts for the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile 
territorial dispute. Indigenous peoples in the Andean region of Latin 
American are fundamental actors in processes of social and economic 
development.  They also ensure the existence of diverse and 
multicultural societies and are a source of strength for democratic 
institutions. Therefore, Bolivia and Chile should utilize the innovative 
and democratic ideas of indigenous peoples to negotiate a solution to 
their territorial dispute. 
As part of resolving their long-lasting territorial conflict, Bolivia 
and Chile could design new and creative solutions. To facilitate a proper 
analysis of these proposals, a conciliation commission can be 
established. Conciliation as an alternative dispute resolution 
mechanism “implies a more in depth study of the dispute as compared 
to mediation, combined with the independence of the third party as it is 
found in adjudication, but aiming for amicable settlement in a 
 
198. Laudy, supra note 165, at 317. 
199. G.A. Res. 2888, supra note 76 ¶ 3. 
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nonbinding manner instead of producing a binding finding of the 
law.”200 
If Bolivia and Chile cannot resolve their pending conflict by 
bilateral negotiations, then a conciliation commission can facilitate its 
resolution. Leading experts, who represent the national interests of both 
countries—including indigenous peoples and civil society 
organizations—can be part of a Bolivian-Chilean Conciliation 
Commission. Article XV of the ATPS defines conciliation as: 
The procedure of investigation and conciliation consists in the 
submission of the controversy to a Commission of Investigation and 
Conciliation, which shall be established in accordance with the 
provisions established in subsequent articles of the present Treaty, 
and which shall function within the limitations prescribed therein.201 
For a successful effort, the members of the commission, from each 
country, must have high credentials, including an understanding of 
indigenous peoples’ interests, history, and languages. There is also a 
need to ensure the participation of academics, from both countries, that 
have the highest levels of knowledge regarding the territorial dispute 
and can provide creative solutions for its resolution.202 
One of the mandates of the commission can be the submission of 
proposals regarding solutions for sovereign access to the Pacific Ocean 
for Bolivia. Similarly, in the drafting of these proposals, the 
commission should also consider strategies to ensure the participation 
of indigenous communities, of both countries, in the negotiations and 
implementation of agreements between the parties. The commission 
should also consider relevant general principles of the law of sea that 
are reflected in the Convention on the Law of the Sea and in customary 
international law. Further, the commission should analyze the 
historical, economic, ethnic, cultural, normative, and political factors 
that can contribute to resolve the conflict. Besides conciliation 
 
200. SVEN M.G. KOOPMANS, DIPLOMATIC DISPUTE SETTLEMENT, THE USE OF 
INTER-STATE CONCILIATION 37 (2008). 
201. See American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogota), supra note 
101, art. XV. 
202. See generally G.A. Res. 50/50, United Nations Model Rules for the 
Conciliation of Disputes between States (Jan. 29, 1996) (The Model Rules can be used 
to facilitate the working of the Bolivia-Chile Conciliation Commission). 
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commissions, systematic public diplomacy efforts should be an 
essential component in the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
dispute. 
The conflicts in Bolivia and Chile, which resulted in dramatic 
changes in both countries, shows the importance of civil society in the 
political processes. In the case of Bolivia, the government of President 
Evo Morales, which led the efforts at the I.C.J., was overthrown.203 In 
the case of Chile, President Sebastián Piñera, who claimed an important 
victory of on behalf of his country in the Bolivia-Chile case at the I.C.J., 
has become one of the most unpopular presidents in the history of 
Chile.204 Popular protests against the economic policies of Mr. Piñera 
resulted in a call for a referendum to change the constitution of Chile.205 
In Bolivia, there will new elections for president, vice-president, and 
members of congress.206 
Considering the strength of civil society movements in Bolivia and 
Chile, civil societies should be the main actors in taking initiatives to 
invent creative solutions for the territorial conflict. Civil society 
organizations can establish bi-national committees to create proposals 
that can eventually be used by a Conciliation Commission established 
by the governments of Bolivia and Chile. Academic institutions in both 
states can establish conciliatory commissions to draft original proposals 
for the resolution of the territorial dispute. Indigenous peoples’ 
organizations can do the same. 
Historically, the governments of Chile and Bolivia did not properly 
address issues regarding the political participation, cultural protection 
and economic development of indigenous communities. As part of the 
 
203. Clarke, supra note 17; see also Paola Flores & Carlos Valdez, Bolivia’s 
president Evo Morales resigns amid election-fraud allegations, deadly protests, USA 
TODAY (Nov. 11, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2019/11/10/evo-morales-bolivia-
president-resigns-amid-protests-allegations/2557032001/. 
204. See Sherwood, supra note 21. 
205. Natalia A. Ramos Miranda, Chile’s Pinera inks law for vote on new 
constitution, REUTERS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-
protests-constitution/chiles-pinera-inks-law-for-vote-on-new-constitution-
idUSKBN1YR1S8. 
206. Daniel Ramos, Bolivia’s dueling parties converge on new vote to calm 




Mantilla: Indigenous Peoples’ Diplomacy, Mediation, and Conciliation as a R
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Updated_Mantilla camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021  10:50 AM 
72 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
ruling elites’ actions, Bolivia and Chile were engaged in several 
conflicts including the Pacific War.207 These actions did not reflect the 
will, nor did they consider the best interests, of the Aymara, Mapuche, 
Quechua, and other indigenous peoples. Considering that ruling elites 
of Chile and Bolivia have not been able to resolve the territorial disputes 
between their countries, the governments should instead consider and 
apply the proposals of indigenous peoples and civil society actors 
regarding the resolution of territorial disputes. 
Through the history of diplomatic negotiations, between Chile and 
Bolivia, there has been a constant failure to achieve a resolution to the 
territorial dispute between these countries. The Chilean government has 
made several unilateral promises regarding its will to find a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict.208 Bolivian governments have not been 
capable of ensuring the resolution of the conflict. Bolivia and Chile 
have not consulted and engaged indigenous peoples and civil society 
actors in negotiation processes, nor in the development of diplomatic 
strategies for the peaceful resolution of territorial conflicts. This 
situation needs to be remedied by ensuring that, in the future, 
indigenous people and civil society actors play a central role in the 
peaceful resolution of the Bolivia-Chile territorial dispute. 
In the process of creating conciliatory commissions at the civil 
society level, it is important to remember that Bolivia is one of the most 
indigenous countries in Latin America. According to the World Bank, 
there are 4.12 million indigenous people which is 41% of the Bolivian 
population.209 Chile also has an important indigenous population. 
According to Chilean Census, 12.8% of the population identify as 
indigenous, and there are 2.185 million indigenous people.210 This 
includes the Mapuche (79.8%), Aymara (7.2%), and Diaguita 
(4.1%).211 
The indigenous communities of Bolivia and Chile should be a key 
part of conciliation commissions with the participation of the Aymara, 
Mapuche, Quechua, and other indigenous peoples. The Bolivian and 
Chilean governments should consider the economic and cultural 
 
207. DIREMAR, supra note 44. 
208. Id. 
209. WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 42, at 25. 
210. Id. 
211. INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE ESTADÍSTICA, supra note 67. 
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interests of the original owners of the territories under dispute. This 
could include the possibility of creating a join administration, of 
territories under dispute, by indigenous peoples of both countries. 
The participation of indigenous people in public diplomacy and 
governmental efforts is also important because of the diverse 
perspectives that they will bring to the resolution of the Bolivia-Chile 
dispute—consistent with their ancestral views of reality. For example, 
in describing the worldview of the Aymara people (who are 
descendants of the Incas), the “Andean people, economic, spiritual, and 
social life is inextricably tied to land and water. The Aymara of Chile 
are struggling to maintain their sustainable and traditional systems of 
irrigation water distribution, agriculture, and pastoralism in one of the 
most arid regions of the world, the Atacama Desert.”212 
Indigenous peoples who are the descendants of the Inca Empire 
continue to inhabit the Atacama region of Chile.213 Therefore, they are 
an ethnic group that understands how the Bolivia-Chile territorial 
conflict has undermined the international relations between the two 
countries. The Aymara and Quechua people are a significant part of the 
Bolivian population and they share similar indigenous worldviews as 
the Aymara, Mapuche, and the other indigenous peoples of Chile that 
can trace their roots to Tiwanaku and Tawantinsuyu.214 For a negotiated 
solution of the territorial conflict between Chile and Bolivia, there is a 
need to reestablish a meaningful, honest and productive dialogue 
between the parties to the conflict. The Aymara and other indigenous 
worldviews recognize the moral imperative of resolving conflicts 
through dialogue, communication, and by embracing a common human 
identity.215 To emphasize importance of indigenous territories in the 
Aymara worldview, “Pachamama is the mother of Aymara culture 
because existence itself is made possible through this inexhaustible 
 
212. Amy Eisenberg, Jaqin Uraqpachat Amuyupa, The Aymara Cosmological 
Vision, 5 LANGSCAPE MAG. (2016),  https://medium.com/langscape-magazine/jaqin-
uraqpachat-amuyupa-f5df7806a8b8. 
213. See Héctor M. Morales, Construcción Social De La 
Etnicidad: Ego y Alter En Atacama, 46 ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS 145, 147 (2013). 
214. See generally Kelly J. Knudson, La Influencia De Tiwanaku En San Pedro 
De Atacama: Una Investigación Utilizando El Análisis De Isótopos Del Estroncio, 33 
ESTUDIOS ATACAMEÑOS, 7–24 (2007). 
215. Eisenberg, supra note 212. 
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source of life. With Pachamama are all the generative spirits connected 
with the animals and crops.”216 
Reciprocity is one of the fundamental principles in reaching a 
negotiated solution to the territorial dispute between Chile and Bolivia.  
In the Aymara worldview, reciprocity is a fundamental normative 
principle that sustains social networks as foundation for the social and 
economic well-being of indigenous communities 217 Reciprocity in 
international negotiations includes the idea of creating new value, 
consistent with the interests of the parties, for their mutual benefit. 
Considering the common cultural identity of the Aymara people and the 
fact that they are one of the original inhabitants of the territory under 
dispute, between Bolivia and Chile, they and other indigenous people, 
including the Mapuche, are uniquely positioned to contribute to find a 
negotiated solution to the problem. Regarding the importance of 
considering the views of indigenous peoples: 
[A]n early Incan family living in the coastal City of Arica and ponder 
how the descendants of that family would manage when the land 
changed hands multiple times between Bolivia, Peru, and Chile in 
the 1800s. Such a family history would undoubtedly include stories 
of indigenous populations being overrun by the Spanish, stories of 
the later generations being pulled between loyalties to Spanish 
royalty, and stories of independence movements motivated by both 
the economic gain that would result from a change of regime and the 
injustice of what the Spanish took from them initially.218 
The indigenous communities of Bolivia and Chile should express 
their viewpoints regarding the peaceful resolution of the territorial 
dispute between the two countries. Considering that indigenous peoples 
were the original owners of the territories under dispute, and that their 
descendants have been affected negatively—both economically and 
existentially—by the Bolivia-Chile conflict, their worldviews and 




218. See ZWIER, supra note 45, at 223. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the Obligation to Negotiate Access to the Pacific Ocean (Bolivia 
v. Chile) case, the I.C.J. did not provide a legal discourse to enable Chile 
and Bolivia to negotiate a peaceful solution to one of the most 
significant territorial disputes in Latin America. The limitations of the 
Court’s reasoning reflects its reliance on legal positivism as a main 
method of legal analysis in the case. If the I.C.J. had utilized an 
integrative jurisprudential approach in the interpretation of 
international law, the Court could have considered the relevance of 
historical, moral, and cultural aspects in the normative resolution of the 
conflict. This could have demonstrated the importance of considering 
the interests of the original owners of the territory under dispute, the 
indigenous peoples of Bolivia and Chile. Considering the globally 
recognized rights of indigenous peoples, including to their ancestral 
territories, it was a mistake not to consider their views in the case. 
Despite its verdict against Bolivia, the I.C.J. recognized that both 
countries should continue to engage in diplomatic negotiations to find 
a solution to a pending problem. This should encourage both countries 
to reengage not only in diplomatic negotiations between governments, 
but also in public diplomacy efforts. Such efforts can include dialogues 
and negotiations between civil society organizations and with the 
essential participation of indigenous communities. This is not only 
consistent with the fundamental principles of global justice, but it is 
also a pragmatic approach that facilitates the inclusion of diverse 
normative and cultural worldviews in the processes in the resolution of 
international conflicts. What the governments and ruling elites of 
Bolivia and Chile were unable to achieve, can perhaps be accomplished 
by indigenous peoples if they are given the opportunity to express their 
views regarding a pending conflict that pertains to the original 
territories. 
This is especially relevant because Bolivia and Chile can trace their 
historical roots to the Inca Empire, one of the greatest indigenous 
civilizations in the history of humankind. This is also relevant because 
in the 21st century context, the people of Chile and Bolivia have an 
opportunity to demonstrate to the international community, that despite 
their governments’ failures in resolving their domestic and international 
problems, their public diplomatic efforts can create new opportunities 
for the resolution of territorial disputes between neighboring countries. 
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